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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the impact of wage subsidies on skill formulation. We analyze two
prototypical models of skill formation: (a) a learning-by-doing model and (b) an on-the-job training
model. We develop conditions on the pricing of jobs under which the two models are equivalent. In
general they are different and have different implications of wage subsidies on skill formation. On-the-job
training models predict that wage subsidies reduce skill formation. Learning-by-doing models predict the
opposite. The provisional evidence favors the learning-by-doing model. We apply our estimates to
investigate the impact of the EITC on skill formation. We estimate that the EITC reduced the long term
wages of participants with low levels of education.
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jjh@uchicago.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent calls for wage subsidies have emphasized their value for attaching low skill persons to the
workplace, attracting them away from lives of idleness or crime (Phelps, 1997; Heckman, Lochner,
Smith, and Taber, 1997; and Lochner, 1998). Previous empirical research on wage subsidies has
focused exclusively on their eﬀects on employment and labor supply. This paper examines the
impact of wage subsidies on skill formation.
By promoting work among those who would not otherwise work, wage subsidies create incen-
tives for workers to invest in skills that are useful in the workplace. The skill formation eﬀects
of wage subsidies on persons who would work without the subsidy are more subtle. If skills are
acquired as a by-product of work (learning-by-doing), wage subsidies will encourage skill acquisi-
tion to the extent that workers increase their labor supply in response to the subsidy. However,
if learning is rivalrous with working, as in Becker (1964) or Ben Porath (1967), wage subsidies
can discourage investment in skills.
There are even more subtle eﬀects of wage subsidies on skill formation arising from the non-
linearity in the return to work created by many proposed schemes. These nonlinearities arise
from the targeted nature of most programs. Speciﬁcally, consider the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), which supplements annual labor earnings for those who work as shown in Figure 1.1 (For
analytical simplicity, we abstract from all other tax and transfer programs implicitly assuming
that they generate proportional schedules that preserve Figure 1 as a key feature of the budget
set facing workers. Whether or not this is true is an open empirical question.) In the ﬁrst region
of Figure 1, [0,a), the hourly wage is subsidized. In the second region, [a,b), the hourly wage
is the pre-subsidy wage, but the worker’s total income is increased by the amount of the annual
subsidy, Sb.I nt h et h i r dr e g i o n ,[b,c), the subsidy is phased out and the eﬀective hourly wage is
below the pre-subsidy wage level, because each hour worked eliminates part of the subsidy. When
earnings are suﬃciently high, at or above c,t h ee ﬀective wage again equals the pre-subsidy wage.
In this paper, we consider the eﬀect of this subsidy on skill formation.
In the standard Becker - Ben Porath economic model of skill formation, the major cost of skill
investment is foregone earnings. Assume, for simplicity, that these are the only costs and ignore
foregone leisure. Time is devoted either to work or investment and people seek to maximize the
present value of their earnings. (We temporarily abstract from the labor-leisure decision in order
to focus on the main impact of the program on skill investment without worrying about wealth
eﬀects on labor supply.)
If skills do not depreciate, wages always rise (or remain constant) over the life cycle as skill
investments are made. For a person starting life on the ﬁrst segment of the EITC schedule, the
opportunity cost of time investing in skill is raised compared to what it would be in the absence
1Strictly speaking, the EITC subsidizes wage earnings rather than wage rates. For a given pre-subsidy wage,
the EITC alters the post-subsidy wage received for each hour worked and is eﬀectively a wage subsidy.
1of the program. If the investment produces suﬃcient earnings growth so that persons eventually
leave the ﬁrst segment as their skills are enhanced, the eﬀect of the subsidy is to reduce skill
formation, because the opportunity cost of time spent investing is increased during the years
when investment is made but the wage payment per hour of work is not increased during the
payoﬀ years. Only if a person stays on the ﬁrst segment throughout his working lifetime will the
eﬀect of the subsidy be neutral on skill formation. In this case, marginal returns and costs rise
in the same proportion and there is no eﬀect on skill investment.
For a person who starts life on the ﬂat segment of the subsidy schedule, the eﬀects of the
subsidy on investment are ambiguous. First, if a person has annual earnings that never leave the
ﬂat segment, there is no eﬀect of the subsidy on skill formation, since there is no marginal eﬀect
of the program on either returns or costs.2 Second, if earnings rise so that the person spends
part of his or her career on the declining segment, skill formation is retarded, because the payoﬀ
to investment in human capital is reduced as the subsidy is withdrawn. If a person jumps from
the ﬂat segment to a post-program earnings level above c, there again would be no eﬀect of the
program on skill formation, although the continuous nature of the skill formation process makes
this case an empirically unlikely one.
Finally, consider a person who begins life with initial earnings in the phase-out segment. In
this case, the implicit tax on earnings makes investment less costly compared to a no-program
world, since earnings foregone are reduced by the subsidy. If investment eventually causes the
person to leave the third segment, the tax on earnings is eventually removed and, hence, the
relative payoﬀ to investment is increased by the subsidy. This case promotes skill formation.
The overall eﬀect of the program on the skill formation of workers aﬀected by the program is
ambiguous even in this simple model. It depends on where workers’ earnings place them in the
schedule and can only be determined by an empirical analysis. Adding the labor-leisure choice
further complicates matters. The wealth eﬀects of the subsidy serve to reduce labor supply and,
hence, the incentive to acquire skills. For workers spending their entire careers on the plateau or
in the phase-out region, wealth eﬀects created by the EITC cause labor supply and investment
to decline. Wage eﬀects are ambiguous, depending on the relative strengths of income and
substitution eﬀects. When substitution eﬀects dominate, the EITC encourages skill investment
for individuals who spend their entire careers in the phase-in region or for those who move from
the phase-out region oﬀ the schedule. Finally, the EITC may draw people into the workplace.
This will increase their hours of work and will increase their incentive to invest in work-related
skills.
Persons may also be drawn into the workforce by the EITC when skills are acquired through
work experience rather than through a separate learning activity as in the Becker - Ben Porath
model. In the conventional learning-by-doing model, investment time and work are the same, and
2Recall that we assume that there are no wealth eﬀects
2the activity of investment is not rivalrous with work. In this framework, the eﬀects of the EITC
on skills accumulated through learning-by-doing are much diﬀerent. For those who would work
even in the program’s absence, skill accumulation depends only on labor supply. So, for workers
induced to work more hours, the EITC raises skills. Those induced to work less by the program
accumulate fewer skills. The EITC only raises hours worked among workers whose earnings lie
in the phase-in region of the schedule, assuming substitution eﬀects dominate income eﬀects in
determining labor supply. For all other workers, the EITC reduces hours worked and, therefore,
skills acquired through learning-by-doing. The contrast between the eﬀects of wage subsidies
on skill formation in a learning-by-doing model and in a Becker - Ben Porath model is a major
ﬁnding of this paper.
In order to clarify the essential features of the program, we initially simplify the analysis.
In Section 2, we use a two period model of skill formation to analyze the eﬀects of age-speciﬁc
proportional wage subsidies or wage taxes on skill acquisition for several types of subsidy pro-
grams using the two competing models of skill formation. At any age, we assume that tax or
subsidy rates are the same irrespective of earnings levels. Thus, we initially abstract from the
endogenously determined tax/subsidy rates of the EITC to avoid non-concavity of the criterion
and nonuniqueness in investment.
We establish that the two main models of skill formation widely used in the literature, the
Becker - Ben Porath on-the-job training (OJT) model and a learning-by-doing (LBD) model, have
diﬀerent implications for the eﬀect of wage subsidies on skill formation. When the conventional
LBD model is carefully examined, it contains an apparent “free lunch” feature — persons who
work also acquire skill. The more they work, the more skills they acquire, so no earnings are
foregone. Foregone leisure is the sole cost of investment in this model. When a market for jobs
with diﬀerent learning content is introduced following Rosen (1972), earnings foregone are added
as a cost of acquiring skills in a learning-by-doing model and the two models become much more
similar. In a very special case, which we establish below, the two models are equivalent if leisure
is added to the Becker - Ben Porath framework and if learning-by-doing opportunities are priced
appropriately.
In Section 3, we discuss speciﬁc features of the EITC program. We go beyond the simple
analysis of age-speciﬁc wage subsidies to consider the actual wage subsidies implicit in the EITC
program, which depend on the level of earnings. We discuss the resulting non-diﬀerentiability
and non-concavity of the criterion function as well as the need to account for a multiplicity of
local optima in estimating the impact of the EITC program and simulating its impact.
We present an analysis of the distribution of female workers with low education over the four
segments of Figure 1. The least educated typically begin their careers in the phase-in region,
[0,a), and move to either the plateau region, [a,b), or phase-out region, [b,c). Thus, investment
is initially discouraged in the OJT framework, while work (and learning) are encouraged in the
3LBD framework. Wealth eﬀects of the EITC typically reduce skill acquisition in both models of
skill formation for women receiving substantial credit amounts.
Section 4 extends the analysis of Section 3 to a multi-period setting. The intuition developed
in the simple two period models applies more generally. Section 5 presents estimates of two
canonical models of skill formation using CPS data on wages and hours worked for women with
low levels of education.
Section 6 uses those estimates to explore the impacts of the EITC program on earnings and
wage growth in the two diﬀerent models of skill formation. Both models produce similar estimates
of EITC-induced entry into the workforce and its associated human capital accumulation. The
models diﬀer greatly in their prediction of the quantitative impact of the EITC program on the
wage growth of those who would work even in the absence of the program. Qualitatively, the
models agree. Both predict declines in potential skill levels among the women we study. But
the predicted declines are quantitatively greater in the OJT model than in the LBD model. The
LBD model predicts substantially larger negative impacts of the EITC on hours worked. As a
result, it also predicts larger declines in earnings than the OJT model. If the entry eﬀects of
the EITC are small, the reductions in average earnings among all uneducated women can be as
large as 18% of the average skill level supplied to the market. While the aggregate eﬀects of the
EITC on skills are similar in the two models, the predicted impacts on speciﬁc groups of workers
a r eo f t e nq u i t ed i ﬀerent depending on which region of the schedule a worker spends most of her
time.3 Average measures of the impact of the EITC on skills mask considerable heterogeneity
in individual responses. These ﬁndings highlight the importance of determining the appropriate
model of skill formation in assessing the impact of the EITC program on the skills and earnings
of workers.
Section 7 brieﬂy discusses other empirical evidence about the process of skill formation, and
Section 8 summarizes and concludes.
2 Models of Wage Subsidies and Skill Formation
This section analyzes several two period models of skill accumulation to investigate the eﬀect
of period-speciﬁc proportional wage subsidies on skill formation. The EITC is not a period-
speciﬁc proportional wage subsidy. But the intuition obtained from an analysis of the simple
period-speciﬁc proportional subsidy and tax case carries over to the more general EITC structure.
We consider both income maximizing models and models with labor supply assuming perfect
credit markets.4 Throughout this paper, we ignore the practically important issues of fraud and
3Even greater heterogeneity is observed when the impacts of the EITC on male earnings and more educated
workers are considered. See Heckman, Lochner and Cossa (1999).
4In Heckman, Lochner and Cossa (1999) we consider versions of our labor supply models with borrowing
constraints. Analytically, the quantitative features are quite similar to those presented here; even the quantitative
results from our simulations in Section 6 do not change much when borrowing constraints are imposed.
4enforcement in the administration of wage subsidy programs that are discussed by Phelps (1997).
Central to our investigation is the speciﬁcation of the skill formation process. The conventional
Becker - Ben Porath model features earnings foregone as the main cost of skill formation. In this
model, a wage subsidy in the ﬁrst period of a two period model tends to divert workers away from
investment and toward market work. On the other hand, second period wage subsidies encourage
ﬁrst period investment.
A model of learning-by-doing (as developed by Heckman, 1971, Weiss, 1972, Killingsworth,
1982, Shaw, 1989, and Altug and Miller, 1990 and 1998) produces completely diﬀerent predictions.
In this model, an hour of work at any job produces general skills that have the same value in
all sectors of the economy. A wage subsidy that promotes work in the ﬁrst period promotes skill
formation. The cost of work and skill acquisition in this model is leisure foregone.
This second model of skill formation appears to have a free lunch aspect to it. People who
work more earn more in that period and in the future. There is no tradeoﬀ between skill formation
and earnings from work as in the Becker - Ben Porath model. Yet, learning is not entirely free,
since a tradeoﬀ between leisure and acquiring skills through work still exists.
What produces the apparent free lunch is the implicit assumption that for any worker an
hour of work in any job is equally eﬀective in producing skill. If jobs diﬀe ri nt h er a t ea tw h i c h
an hour of work produces skill, a market for jobs arises that is usually ignored in analyses of
learning-by-doing models. All current workers who plan to work in the future will cluster in jobs
with the highest learning content unless those jobs command higher prices. Higher prices for jobs
with more training content mean lower ﬁrst period wages for such jobs if workers of the same
skill level and tastes have choices among otherwise equal jobs with diﬀerent training content.5
With the addition of heterogeneity in learning opportunities, and prices of those opportunities, a
tradeoﬀ between ﬁrst period investment and earnings from work re-emerges.
2.1 Speciﬁcations of Skill Formation Equations
T h em o s tc o m m o n l yu s e ds p e c i ﬁcation of the human capital accumulation process is due to Ben
Porath (1967). Human capital in period 1, H1, is produced by time investment I.( W ea s s u m e
there is no depreciation, so human capital is non-decreasing.) Thus, we write
H1 − H0 = F(I)
with F0 > 0, F00 < 0, 0 ≤ I ≤ 1,w h e r eI is the proportion of time spent investing, and H0 is the
initial stock of human capital.
Assuming a perfect capital market with interest rate r and an eﬃciency units model of labor
services with price R per eﬃciency unit of human capital, and period 0 and 1 tax/subsidy rates
5Rosen (1972) introduced the notion of a market for jobs with diﬀerent training/learning content.
5of τ0 and τ1, respectively, agents choose I to maximize




subject to (1). Investment is rivalrous with earnings. This formulation recognizes that there will
be no investment in the second (and ﬁnal) period of life.6
Optimality requires that




Changes in R do not aﬀect skill investment. At an interior (0 <I<1), increases in r and H0
decrease investment. The higher the ﬁrst period opportunity wage or the lower the discounted
return from investment, the less time is spent investing. 7
A common wage subsidy or tax across periods (τ0 = τ1) clearly does not aﬀect investment.
Both the marginal returns and marginal costs are aﬀected equally. However, if τ0 > τ1, investment
is reduced compared to the case where τ0 = τ1;i fτ0 < τ1, then investment is increased. We
return to this model and analyze it more thoroughly after we develop a comparison model of
learning-by-doing.
In the LBD model, skills are produced by work. Let Lt be leisure in period t. There is no
investment time, so hours of work in period t are given by 1 − Lt. In this scheme,
(1) H1 − H0 = ϕ(1 − L0)
with ϕ0 > 0, ϕ00 < 0. In principle, work in the second period also produces human capital, but
that output is not valued since there is no third period. The cost of work and acquiring new skills
is leisure foregone. To introduce such costs, it is necessary to introduce a utility function that
values leisure. Then, individuals choose consumption and leisure to




(where U is strictly concave in its arguments and ρ is a time discount factor) subject to the
lifetime budget constraint
(3) RH0[1 − L0](1 + τ0)+
R
1+r
H1[1 − L1](1 + τ1)+A0 = C0 +
C1
1+r
and (1) where A0 represents initial assets. Throughout this paper, we assume that goods and
leisure are normal. Let λ denote the LaGrange multiplier associated with (3). Assuming an










ϕ0(1 − L0)[1 − L1](1 + τ1)
1+r
¶
6In this paper, we only consider the individual’s problem, ignoring the general equilibrium eﬀects of policy on
factor prices.







R(H0 + ϕ(1 − L0))(1 + τ1).
The price of time in the ﬁrst period includes potential earnings (RH0(1+τ0)) plus the eﬀect of
an extra unit of work on discounted future earnings. As ﬁrst noted by Heckman (1971), even when
ρ = r, it is possible that wages grow between periods 0 and l, but labor supply remains the same.
This occurs if the total opportunity cost of leisure
µ
RH0(1 + τ0)+
Rϕ0(1 − L0)[1 − L1](1 + τ1)
1+r
¶
in period 0 equals the realized wage in period 1 (RH0 + Rϕ(1 − L0)(1 + τ1)).
In this model, an increase in R produces income and substitution eﬀects. Compensating to
eliminate income eﬀects (holding λ constant), an increase in R promotes skill formation and
labor supply. There is no tradeoﬀ between investment and work, because work is investment. If
wages are subsidized (τ0 > 0)i np e r i o d0a n dt a x e d( τ1 < 0)i np e r i o d1 ,t h ee ﬀects on skill
formation are ambiguous: the ﬁrst period wage, RH0(1 + τ0), is increased but the future return,
Rϕ0(1 − L0)[1 − L1]
1+r
(1 + τ1), is diminished.
In contrast to the model of skill investment previously analyzed, a compensated wage subsidy
in period zero that is changed to a wage tax in period one has ambiguous eﬀects. It may increase
skills if the positive eﬀects on current returns more than oﬀset the negative eﬀects on future
returns. Similarly, a compensated wage tax applied in period zero followed by a wage subsidy
in period one also has ambiguous eﬀects on skills. The resulting increase in the return on future
work may promote work (and, hence, learning) in the initial period. If τ1 =0 , a wage subsidy in
period 0 (τ0 > 0) promotes skill formation, while a wage tax (τ0 < 0) lowers skills — exactly the
opposite of what is predicted in the Becker - Ben Porath investment framework.
2.2 Reconciling the Two Models of Skill Formation
The two models just considered have diﬀerent predictions about the eﬀects of simple tax and
subsidy schemes on skill formation. What is the source of this diﬀerence? We now show that
adding leisure to the ﬁrst model does not change the qualitative predictions derived from it,
provided that we compensate for income eﬀects and that solutions are interior. Allowing diﬀerent
jobs to have diﬀerent training content and pricing out the training moves the two models together.
To augment the ﬁrst model, the utility function described by (2) is maximized with respect
to consumption, leisure, and investment subject to the lifetime budget constraint:
RH0[1 − I − L0](1 + τ0)+
R
1+r




(This expression incorporates the observation that there is no investment, I,i nt h eﬁnal period.)
The interior ﬁrst order conditions for leisure and investment become
(6a) U2(C0,L 0)=λRH0(1 + τ0)









F0(I)[1 − L1](1 + τ1)=RH0(1 + τ0).
7In this extended Becker - Ben Porath OJT model, changes in R are no longer neutral. Holding
wealth eﬀects constant, an increase in R increases skill formation by encouraging labor supply
in period 1. The qualitative eﬀects of changes in taxes and subsidies in periods 0 and 1 are the
same as in the income maximizing version of this model. If τ0 < 0 and τ1 > 0, skill accumulation
is fostered compared to the case where τ0 = τ1 =0 .I fτ0 > 0 and τ1 < 0, skill accumulation is
dampened. Adding leisure but compensating for wealth eﬀects, we obtain the same predictions
about the impact of period-speciﬁc wage subsidies on investment as those produced in the original
Becker - Ben Porath model. The crucial economic diﬀerence between the OJT and LBD models
of skill formation is not that one model excludes leisure while the other includes it. Rather, the
major source of the diﬀerence derives from the fact that investment and labor supply compete
for the agent’s time in the OJT model, while they do not in the LBD model.
Now consider another case where ﬁrms diﬀer in the rate at which workers learn from an hour
of work. All workers who plan to work in period 1 would ﬂock to the ﬁrms oﬀering the highest
total earnings package (inclusive of future earnings). If ﬁrms pay the same spot wage, R,f o rH0,
the ﬁrm with the higher learning potential would attract all the workers if it did not charge for
its learning opportunities. Only workers who did not plan to work in period 1 would ignore the
training potential of a prospective job. Those who plan to work a lot would value it highly.
To investigate this model more systematically, let θ index the investment content of a job, so




so opportunities with higher θ produce greater learning-by-doing per hour of work. Assume
further that ϕ(0;θ)=0 , for all θ, so that a person must work in order to harvest the beneﬁto f
θ. For the same wage, RH0, young workers would prefer to work in ﬁrms with higher θ.O n l y
persons who choose not to work in the future are unconcerned about the θ content of their job.
Implicit in the learning-by-doing speciﬁcations used in the literature is the assumption that all
ﬁrms provide the same learning opportunities — i.e. θ is identical across ﬁrms.
If it is not, and if there is a distribution of θ across ﬁr m s ,s a yw i t ha nu p p e rl i m i tθ and a
lower limit θ, and if, for whatever reason, there are two or more θ-types of ﬁrms in the market
at any time, then a market price for training, P(θ), will emerge. The exact speciﬁcation of the
pricing function critically aﬀects the analysis and depends on both supply and demand factors
for labor and learning. In this revised LBD model, the agent’s problem is to choose θ along with
C0, C1, L0,a n dL1 subject to the revised budget constraint. Consider two ﬁrms that diﬀer in
their training eﬀectiveness. Firm 1 oﬀers less learning, so θ1 < θ2. For the same hours of work in
period 0, an hour of work at ﬁrm 2 produces greater earnings in period 1. The more hours spent
working in period 1, the greater the gain from working at ﬁrm 2 in period 0. If there were an
unlimited supply of training opportunities at θ = θ, all young workers would congregate at ﬁrms
8with such opportunities if they plan to work in the second period. If the supply of training jobs
is limited for some reason, workers will sort to ﬁrms with diﬀerent θ-types. A market for training
options will emerge. Ceteris paribus, workers who will work more in the second period will place
greater value on high θ jobs, and will be willing to pay more for them.
For analytical simplicity, assume a continuum of θ-type ﬁrms co-exist in the market where
θ ∈ [θ,θ] Young workers who do not plan to work in period 1 will sort into low θ ﬁrms. So will
old workers. We assume that the price for a job of type θ exists and the pricing function P(θ) is
diﬀerentiable in θ.8 In this speciﬁcation, we think of the ﬁr ma sp r o v i d i n gal e a r n i n ge n v i r o n m e n t
common for all workers irrespective of the hours they work. Persons who work more will derive
more learning from their jobs. A ﬁxed charge P(θ) is paid by all workers in the ﬁrm. Assuming
that ﬁrms use H in production and that only eﬃciency units matter in producing ﬁnal output,
the gross payment to human capital is RH for a person with human capital bundle H.
The pre-subsidy period 0 earnings for a person who chooses a job θ and has human capital
H0 is
W(H0,θ)=RH0(1 − L0) − P(θ).
The pre-subsidy hourly wage rate is
w(H0,θ)=W(H0,θ)/(1 − L0).
The pre-subsidy hourly wage understates the potential wage rate, RH0,a sl o n ga sP(θ) > 0.T h e
understatement is greater the greater the learning content of the job.9
The budget constraint for the extended learning-by-doing model is
(30)[ RH0[1 − L0] − P(θ)](1 + τ0)+
RH1[1 − L1](1 + τ1)
1+r
+ A0 = C0 +
C1
1+r
and the revised skill accumulation equation is
(10) H1 − H0 = ϕ(1 − L0;θ).
With obvious notational changes to reﬂect the introduction of θ,t h eﬁrst order conditions (4)
and (5) are the same. The new ﬁrst order condition arising from the choice of θ is









8Rosen (1972) introduced the notion of a market for jobs with diﬀerent learning content. He reinterprets the
B e nP o r a t hm o d e lt ol e tI play the role of the index θ in our notation. Diﬀerent ﬁrms may oﬀer jobs with
diﬀerent investment/learning content I,a n dﬁrms producing more learning for workers produce less output of the
consumption good. This generates an implicit market whereby ﬁrms charge workers an amount RHI for their
learning. It also produces mobility across jobs as workers reduce I over the life cycle. Rosen does not consider the
learning-by-doing model analyzed in this paper, in which hours of work at a ﬁrm produce skill.
9This has substantial implications for econometric estimates of learning-by-doing models as estimated in Altug
and Miller (1990, 1998). They implicitly assume that all ﬁrms oﬀer the same training opportunities, and they are
free. If training is costly, they understate the ﬁrst period-wage, and the understatement is greater for ﬁrms with
w o r k e r sm a k i n gm o r ei n v e s t m e n t .
10To guarantee an interior solution for θ,i ti ss u ﬃcient that P
00(θ) > 0 and
∂2ϕ
∂θ2 < 0. More generally we just
require that standard second order conditions hold.
9This equation makes clear that individuals who intend to work more in period 1 (e.g. if they have
high skill levels or few assets) will sort into high θ jobs. In the second and ﬁnal period, workers
will cash out their investment and choose jobs with low training content.
In this amended learning-by-doing model, a compensated wage subsidy in period zero (τ0 > 0)
raises the cost of θ and causes agents to reduce the learning content of their work compared to
the non-subsidized case (τ0 =0 ) . The net eﬀect on skill formation is ambiguous. Labor supply
(1 − L0) increases and θ decreases. Thus,
∂(H1 − H0)
∂τ0








The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is positive, and the second term is negative, making the
overall impact of the subsidy on skill formation ambiguous. A wage subsidy in the second period
(τ1 > 0) promotes investment.
If there are implicit prices for jobs with diﬀerent training content, then a period 0 wage
subsidy in a LBD model may retard skill formation, just as it does in a Becker - Ben Porath
OJT model. In general, the extended LBD model considered here produces two oﬀsetting eﬀects.
Compensating for income eﬀects, a higher wage subsidy will induce more hours of work and will
produce more skills. At the same time, subsidized agents shift to lower θ jobs so the investment
content of learning is diminished. The net eﬀect on skill formation is ambiguous. Adding back
income eﬀects tends to reduce incentives to acquire skills.
Notice the similarity in the ﬁrst order condition for θ, equation (8), and the ﬁrst order con-
dition for investment, I, in the Becker - Ben Porath model, equation (7). Conditions governing
consumption are identical. The greatest diﬀerence between the models arises in the ﬁrst order
conditions for leisure. (Compare the conditions in (5) with those of (6)). If learning opportunities
in a ﬁrm can be tailored to the individual worker and it is possible to appropriately price out each
hour of learning for a ﬁxed θ, then the LBD model and the Becker - Ben Porath OJT model are
analytically equivalent. However, this requires that ﬁr m sb ea b l et op r i c eθ diﬀerently for persons
who work diﬀerent hours in periods 0 and 1. The simple pricing scheme P(θ) is not enough.
To see this, consider a more general pricing scheme for learning opportunities, θ:
P(θ,1 − L0)=f(θ)+ω(θ)[1 − L0]
where f(θ) is a ﬁxed charge for training opportunity θ and ω(θ) is the marginal cost of an hour
of training in a ﬁrm with learning parameter θ.
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The new ﬁrst order condition for θ now becomes






Under certain conditions, the OJT model and the extended LBD model are analytically equiv-
alent. To establish this equivalence observe that θ in the LBD model plays a role similar to I in
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If this condition is satisﬁed, the marginal price of L0 in both models is RH0(1+ τ0). Qualitative
predictions about the eﬀects of taxes and subsidies on human capital and wage growth are identical
in both models when θ is priced in this fashion. They can be made quantitatively identical with
a suitable choice of F and ϕ and the parameters of the model.
For this equivalence to arise, ﬁrms must be able to price discriminate based on the current
and future number of hours a worker wants to work. That is, ﬁrms must be able to marginally
charge workers based on the total return they receive from learning at their θ ﬁrm. The marginal
relative return to providing additional θ (scaled by its price) must match the marginal relative
return to investment in the Becker - Ben Porath model.
In equilibrium, the pricing scheme for θ will depend not only on the technology of learning,
but it also depends on the supply of learning capabilities (θ) at existing ﬁrms. Recall that the
prices for θ arise from a market equilibrium between buyers and sellers of labor and learning
opportunities. From these conditions, a hedonic pricing scheme for work/learning will arise. We
would not expect the ﬁne price discrimination required to equate the two models to arise in
general. Furthermore, it seems extremely unlikely that ﬁrms can accurately predict the amount
of hours a worker plans to work in the future, even if it could perfectly price their learning/work
package. Thus, the two models are quite distinct and require separate analysis.
2.3 Employment and Skill Formation
For all of the models of skill formation we have discussed, subsidies that promote work compared
to non-employment will promote the acquisition of skills. In the LBD model, subsidies in any
period encourage employment in all periods. Wage subsidies in the ﬁrst period promote ﬁrst
period employment thereby generating new skills. Those new skills create additional incentives
to work in the second period. On the other hand, second period wage subsidies that create
employment in the second period also raise the return to work in the initial period. In the Becker
11- Ben Porath OJT model, only subsidies that generate employment in the second period promote
skill formation, because they raise the value of investment in the initial period. However, ﬁrst
period wage subsidies actually discourage skill formation, since investment is rivalrous with work.
2.4 Schooling
Schooling is deﬁned as the case where I =1in the Becker - Ben Porath model. Wage subsidies
during the schooling years divert persons away from investment (in schooling or job training) and
toward work. However, wage subsidies during the post-schooling years raise the payoﬀ to work
and, hence, promote schooling earlier on.
The learning-by-doing model must be extended to accommodate schooling. If schooling is
m o d e l e da sa na c t i v i t yt h a ti sr i v a l r o u sw i t hw o rk, we obtain the same predictions from this
model as from a Becker - Ben Porath model: wage subsidies during the schooling years reduce
schooling. However, the reductions in overall skill formation are partially oﬀset by increases in
skill acquired through work experience.
We now adapt this framework to analyze the EITC program.
3 The EITC Program and its Recipients
3.1 A Description of the EITC Program
Beginning in 1975, the EITC program has provided a subsidy (or tax credit) to low income
workers. The amount of the subsidy depends on total labor income as well as the number of
children living with (supported by) the worker.11 For wage income W, the EITC schedule (for





SaWW < a “phase-in”
Sb a ≤ W<b “plateau”
Sb − Sc(W − b) b ≤ W<c “phase-out”
0 W ≥ c
where Sa = Sb/a and Sc = Sb/(c − b). Figure 1 graphs the EITC schedule as a function of
pre-subsidy earnings. In terms of the notation of the last section, Sa plays the role of (1 + τ),
τ > 0, for a person with wages w = W/(1−L) provided W<a ; Sb corresponds to τ =0with A0
enhanced by Sb; and phase three corresponds to Sc =1+τ with τ < 0 and asset income adjusted
by Sb + Scb. In the case of the EITC, however, the subsidy level depends on earnings levels,
which depend on individual work and investment choices. The EITC program generates non-
diﬀerentiable constraints with non-convex regions so that some care must be taken in analyzing
it.
11The current law states that only children under nineteen (or under 24 if a full-time student) living in the
taxpayer’s household for more than half of the calendar year qualify.
12If agents are uncertain about the exact location of the budget set, and we account for the
eﬀects of all other programs on the eﬀective tax subsidy schedule facing workers, the problem of
non-convexity may diminish. In this paper we focus on the EITC program in isolation of other
programs, assuming that persons know their nonconvex budget set.
Table 1 shows the EITC schedule for tax year 1994 as an example. Families with two or more
children receive the greatest credit for any given income level, with a maximum credit of $2,528.
Families with one dependent child can receive up to $2,038, while adults with no children can
receive at most $306. While the amount of the subsidy has risen substantially since the early
eighties (with major expansions in 1986, 1990, and 1993), the basic structure has not changed.
Only modest changes have taken place since 1994.
3.2 The Qualifying Population
Since nearly 1/4 of all families with two or more children who qualify for the EITC are headed by
a single mother and more than 1/3 of qualifying families with one child (or no children) are single
women (see Table 2), we focus our empirical analysis on women. Furthermore, the EITC aims to
supplement the incomes of less educated women. As a result, more than half of qualifying women
have no college experience. We, therefore, further concentrate our eﬀorts on understanding the
role of the EITC in decisions among women with a high school education or less. Using the 1994
March Current Population Survey (CPS), we study the distribution of women qualifying for the
EITC by age, race, and educational background.
We divide family income into seven distinct regions, including the phase-in, plateau, and
phase-out zones, as well as regions around the kinks at a, b,a n dc.12 The values of a, b,a n dc
depend on the number of qualifying children and are based on the 1994 EITC schedule shown in
Table 1.
Since it is necessary to identify qualifying children, we limit our sample of potential female
recipients to heads of household. The EITC amount is based on family earnings, so we add
spouse’s earnings, if present, to those of the household head. (We do not model joint labor
supply decisions.) Earnings include wage income, farm self-employment income, and business
self-employment income. We also limit our sample to women ages 18-65. When determining the
number of qualifying children for a household, we include all of the household head’s natural or
adopted children, grandchildren, step children, and foster children under 19 (or under 24 if the
child is currently enrolled in school full-time).
Table 3 shows the distribution of working female high school dropouts with one or two children
with respect to their position within the EITC schedule. Overall, about 35-43% of them have
earnings low enough to place them in the phase-in region of the schedule, while around 30% lie
in the phase-out region. Among single mothers with less than a high school education, around
12See Table A-1 of the appendix for a more detailed description of the seven regions.
1350% have earnings in the phase-in region. Disaggregating by age, approximately 50% of all young
female high school dropouts with children have earnings in the phase-in region. That number
drops about ten percentage points each ten years of age for women with one child, due to rising
income proﬁles over the life cycle. The fraction of women with two or more children and earnings
in the phase-in region only declines as they move from their twenties to their thirties. The fraction
of working dropouts in the phase-out region moves in the opposite direction from the fraction in
the phase-in region. The fraction of working dropouts with one or two children who earn more
than the maximum cutoﬀ for the EITC is quite small, ranging from 5-17%. Single women with
little schooling are almost twice as likely to have earnings in the phase-in region as are married
women who are the heads of their households. Single mothers earning more than the maximum
allowable amount are quite rare.
As seen in Table 4, a somewhat similar story can be told for high school graduates (without
any college), except that their earnings distribution is shifted to the right. About 20% of graduate
mothers with one child and 27% with two or more children — most of them under age 30 — have
earnings in the phase-in region. By age 30, a large majority of graduates have earnings in the
phase-out region or higher. By age 40, about 40% of female high school graduates with children
have earnings too high to qualify for the EITC.
In summary, dropout mothers typically earn incomes placing them in the phase-in region of the
EITC schedule, while mothers with a high school diploma are more likely to have earnings in the
phase-out region (and beyond). We next turn to a discussion of those impacts on skill formation
and hours worked modifying the simple models developed in Section 2 to accommodate speciﬁc
features of the EITC program. We extend the models to a multiperiod setting in Section 4.
3.3 Allowing For Endogenous Tax-Subsidy Rates
First, consider the income-maximizing Ben Porath model. Tax rates are endogenous under the
EITC, so the agent’s problem becomes:
(9) max
I
V =[ RH0(1 − I)(1 + Sa)] · 1(RH0(1 − I) <a )
+[RH0(1 − I)+Sb] · 1(a ≤ RH0(1 − I) <b )
+[RH0(1 − I)(1 − Sc)+Sb + Scb] · 1(b ≤ RH0(1 − I) <c )











· 1(a ≤ RH1 <b )+
·
RH1(1 − Sc)+Sb + Scb
1+r
¸






· 1(RH1 ≥ c)
subject to the human capital production function, F(I),w h e r e1(A)=1if A is true; 1(A)=0
otherwise.
This ungainly expression captures the essential features of the EITC program. First, it induces
an o n - d i ﬀerentiable reward function, and second, it introduces a non-concavity to the problem.
14For payoﬀ function V , we are not guaranteed that V is everywhere concave, i.e. for ¯ I = λI1 +
(1 − λ)I2 and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
V (I) ≥ λV (I1)+( 1− λ)V (I2).
Appendix B formally demonstrates how non-concavity can arise for persons starting in the phase-
out region. This potential nonconcavity leads to multiple local optima in some cases, and requires
non-local methods for solving and estimating the model. (The problem becomes even more
diﬃcult when more periods are added to the model, as in Section 4.)
All of the other skill accumulation models are similarly plagued by this problem. In the
Becker - Ben Porath model with leisure, the budget constraint has to be revised to account for
t h es c h e d u l ei nt h ef o l l o w i n gw a y :
(10) A0 +[ RH0(1 − I − L0)(1 + Sa)] · 1(RH0(1 − I − L0) <a )
+[RH0(1 − I − L0)+Sb] · 1(a ≤ RH0(1 − I − L0) <b )
+[RH0(1 − I − L0)(1 + Sc)+Sb + Scb] · 1(b ≤ RH0(1 − I − L0) <c )











· 1(a ≤ RH1(1 − L1) <b )
+
·
RH1(1 − Sc)+Sb + Scb
1+r
¸






· 1(RH1(1 − L1) ≥ c).
An analogous modiﬁcation is required for the learning-by-doing model. The endogeneity of the
tax-subsidy parameters under the EITC coupled with the non-diﬀerentiability and non-concavity
of the model greatly complicates both theoretical and empirical analysis.
4 A Multi-period Model
We now present models of on-the-job training and learning-by-doing in a multi-period setting.
We present an heuristic analysis of the dynamic impacts of the EITC on labor supply and skill
formation in both models. In most cases, as in the simple two period models previously examined,
the eﬀect of the EITC on hours worked and skill accumulation is ambiguous and depends on the
balance of many oﬀsetting forces. However, the two canonical learning models produce very
diﬀerent predictions about the eﬀects of the EITC on skill formation. Rather than formally
derive all of the properties of these models, we discuss the main implications of such a derivation
to guide the simulations and estimation reported below.
Both models discussed in this section assume that individuals choose sequences of consump-
tion, C, and leisure, L, to maximize total (discounted) lifetime utility. In the OJT model, individ-
uals will also choose investment in skills, I, as discussed below. Government policy is described by
ﬂat income (or wage) tax rates, τ, and the Earned Income Tax Credit, S(.), which is a function of
15pre-tax labor earnings, W. Labor earnings depend on the amount of time spent working and the
human capital level, H,s ot h a tW = H(1 − I − L).T h i se ﬃciency units assumption normalizes
human capital in terms of the pre-tax hourly wage rate. After-tax interest rates are denoted by
r.
If utility is time-separable and individuals have single-period preferences U(C,L) and time
discount factor, δ, we can write the individual maximization problem as13





subject to the asset (A) accumulation equation
A0 =( 1+r)A +( 1− τ)W(1 − L − I)+S(W) − C,
the somewhat more general human capital equation
H0 = H + F(H,I,1 − I − L),
and the time constraints 0 ≤ I + L ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ I,L ≤ 1. We allow for the possibility that both
work and investment time raise skill levels and also allow for human capital to be self-productive.
We ignore the market for jobs with diﬀerent learning content, leaving its development for another
occasion. As suggested above, such a model would likely produce impacts somewhere between
those of the two pure models presented here. We assume that workers live through age T and






=0 .W h e r e
VT+1is the value function in period T +1 , at birth, individuals are endowed with an initial skill
level, H0, and assets, A0. We assume that U(C,L) is separable, increasing, and concave in both
of its arguments.
4.1 On-the-Job Training
The model of on-the-job training posits that skills are only acquired through costly time invest-







∂(1 − I − L)
≡ 0.
We also assume that
∂F
∂H
≥ 0 throughout, so that human capital is self-productive.
The EITC schedule, S(W),i sn o td i ﬀerentiable and also produces a non-convex budget set
for individuals. As previously noted, this feature greatly complicates the analysis. Individuals
can potentially choose bundles of investment and labor supply that place them at a point of
non-diﬀerentiability (a, b,o rc). Non-convexity of the budget set also implies that more than one
set of (C,I,L) may satisfy local conditions for a maximum.
13Let x
0 denote next period’s value for any variable or function x.
16Fortunately, the qualitative conclusions of the two period model with ﬁxed period-speciﬁc
tax and subsidy rates continue to hold in a more general life cycle setting. The value of human
capital depends positively on the number of hours worked in the future. In addition, since human
capital also helps to produce further human capital, the more an individual intends to work in
t h ef u t u r e ,t h em o r eh eg a i n sf r o mr a i s i n gh i ss k i l l level. Alternatively, if an individual does not
intend to work in the future, there is no value to investing in human capital.14 Therefore, to
t h ee x t e n tt h a tt h eE I T Ci n c r e a s e sh o u r sw o r k e d , it also increases the marginal return to human
capital and skill investment.
There are three eﬀects operating. The ﬁrst two eﬀects of the EITC on human capital invest-
ment can be broadly categorized as follows. First there is an income eﬀect — the EITC increases
total lifetime wealth like a lump-sum subsidy, which encourages the consumption of leisure and
discourages work . This tends to reduce investment in skills.15 Second, there is a compensated
substitution eﬀect. By altering net wage rates, the EITC induces a substitution eﬀect (in the
opposite direction as the income eﬀect) on hours worked. This impacts investment through cur-
rent and future hours worked. There is also a direct eﬀect of the EITC on the marginal costs of
and returns to investment. Direct eﬀects are the only ones operating in an income maximizing
model. A positive marginal subsidy rate raises the marginal cost of investment by raising the
opportunity cost of time, but it also increases the return to investment in skills by raising future
net wage rates.
We explore each of these eﬀects for individuals with diﬀerent life cycle earnings proﬁles. As
in the simple two period model, any labor force entry induced by the EITC program raises skill
formation compared to what it would be if an individual never worked. First, consider individuals
whose labor earnings would be less than a in Figure 1 at all ages in the absence of the EITC. They
face a positive marginal subsidy for each hour they work, which increases their net wage rate.
Standard income and substitution eﬀects would govern labor supply decisions — income eﬀects
would discourage work and substitution eﬀects would encourage work. Depending on which eﬀect
dominates, individuals may work more or less. If the substitution eﬀect dominates the income
eﬀect (i.e. individuals have upward sloping labor supply curves), individuals would work more
in response to the EITC. As a result, the returns to human capital investment would increase,
and individuals would respond by investing more in their skills. Direct eﬀects on investment
would be oﬀsetting, since the marginal returns and marginal costs increase by exactly the same
proportion. Thus on net, under these conditions agents would invest more and experience greater
wage growth.
Individuals whose incomes are between a and b throughout their careers (in the absence of the
14If, as in Heckman (1976), the marginal utility of leisure depends positively on human capital, human capital
has value even when there is no work.
15In Heckman (1976), wealth eﬀects on labor supply do not translate into eﬀects on investment, because human
capital increases the marginal value of leisure at the same rate it increases wage rates.
17EITC) would receive a lump-sum subsidy of Sb during each period of work (once again, assuming
momentarily that the EITC did not alter their incentives enough to move them oﬀ the plateau
region). In this case, there would be only income eﬀects on labor supply operating through the
lump sum subsidy and no direct eﬀects on the marginal costs and returns to investment. The
EITC unambiguously discourages labor supply and human capital investment through the income
eﬀect.16
Next, examine the eﬀects of the EITC on individuals whose earnings would increase from
the (0,a) region to the [a,b) region as they age.17 Wealth eﬀects again tend to discourage work
and investment. Income eﬀects operating through higher wage rates in the phase-in region also
discourage work and investment, while substitution eﬀects have the opposite eﬀect. Finally, the
marginal costs of investment are increased at ages when the worker is in the phase-in region of the
EITC; however, the marginal returns to investment are increased by a lesser amount, since net
wage rates are only higher for a fraction of future work years. At the last age for which earnings
are less than a, the marginal costs for investment are raised by the marginal subsidy rate, while
the marginal returns to investment in skills are unaﬀected by the EITC since the marginal subsidy
rate falls to zero in the plateau region. Unless substitution eﬀects on labor supply are substantial
in early periods, we should expect to observe reductions in investment in response to the EITC.
We should also expect to observe a discontinuity in investment and hours worked proﬁles when
individuals move into the plateau region, since the marginal cost of investment and leisure declines
discontinuously. Finally, we might also observe individuals reducing their investment and hours
worked proﬁles enough to keep income below (or at) a for many years.
The eﬀects of the EITC on investment and labor supply for individuals always within the
phase-out region are diﬀerent yet. Wealth eﬀects from the lump sum income adjustment serve to
discourage labor supply and investment. In addition, a lower marginal wage rate causes the agent
to favor leisure if substitution eﬀects dominate income eﬀects. The direct eﬀects on marginal
investment costs and returns are the opposite of those that arise during the phase-in region of the
schedule. Both marginal costs and returns are directly reduced by the EITC, exactly cancelling
each other so the direct eﬀect is zero. So, the net eﬀect on investment and hours worked depends
on the balance of income and substitution eﬀects. For upward sloping labor supply curves, we
would expect reductions in hours worked and investment for individuals who stay within the
phase-out region. As above, the EITC may reduce investment and work enough to push early
earnings into the plateau region.
For those moving from the plateau to the phase-out region of the EITC schedule, investment
and hours worked are likely to be lower than they would be without the tax credit. Again, income
eﬀects discourage work and investment. Substitution eﬀects operate as just described during the
16In fact, the EITC might discourage investment enough to lower earnings to keep people at kink a.
17Recall that labor earnings are generally increasing with age in the absence of the EITC.
18phase-out region. The increase in eﬀective marginal tax rates associated with moving from the
plateau to the phase-out region directly aﬀects the marginal returns and costs of investment like
a progressive tax. The marginal costs of investment are unaﬀected while in the plateau region
of the schedule; however, the marginal returns to investment are reduced during later earnings
periods when the individual’s income places him in the phase-out region. Thus, holding labor
supply constant, the EITC would tend to reduce investment in human capital at early ages.18
The disincentive eﬀects may be so great as to reduce investment and work such that earnings
never escape the plateau region.
Finally, we examine the eﬀects of the EITC on individuals whose earnings would normally
begin in the phase-out region and would increase to the point that they were no longer qualiﬁed to
receive any credit (moving from [b,c) to c and beyond.) Income and substitution eﬀects all operate
as discussed above while earnings are in the phase-out region. The marginal costs of investment
are reduced while in the phase-out portion of the schedule, since reductions in earnings caused by
increases in investment are partially oﬀset by a higher subsidy. However, the marginal returns do
not decline equiproportionally, since no loss in subsidy is experienced when labor income increases
during years when individuals earn more than c. For inelastic labor supply, the direct eﬀects of
the EITC on investment should dominate indirect eﬀects through hours worked, so investment
is encouraged by the EITC. It is possible to observe declines in hours worked and increases in
investment in response to the EITC for these higher income workers. To the extent that the
EITC directly encourages investment and thereby raises skill levels and wage rates later in life,
it likely results in increased hours worked at older ages.
It is important to remember that investment, consumption, and hours worked are all jointly
determined. Policy impacts on one dimension aﬀect the other dimensions indirectly. We have
highlighted three primary eﬀects of the EITC on investment and labor supply decisions. The
balance of these eﬀects and the interrelationships among them are an empirical question we
address below. The EITC is likely to discourage investment among low income workers starting
on the ﬁrst phase of the constraint and to encourage investment among workers moving from the
phase-out region to beyond the schedule.
4.2 Learning-by-Doing
We next explore a basic experience-based model of learning-by-doing. We ignore costly time










18To the extent that the level of human capital increases the marginal returns to investment, investment may also
decline once individuals reach the phase-out region (holding hours worked constant) due to reductions in earlier
investment.




We ﬁrst present a brief description of individual behavior in the absence of the EITC. When
δ−1 =1+r, consumption and the marginal value of assets are constant over the life cycle. In the
learning-by-doing model, there are two changing forces acting on leisure which operate in opposite
directions over the life cycle. As before, increasing human capital increases wages. This force
implies declining leisure and increasing labor supply with age. On the other hand, the marginal
value of additional labor market experience and human capital declines with age, since there are
fewer future years to reap the beneﬁts of higher wages. This second force tends to cause labor
supply to decline with age. The net eﬀect is ambiguous and will inevitably depend on the exact
nature of the skill production process and preferences.
The EITC aﬀects the marginal value of an additional hour of work today on future earnings
and the increase in future earnings due to an increase in work in the current period. As with the
OJT model, we discuss the eﬀects of the EITC on labor supply and skill formation for workers
with diﬀerent lifetime earnings paths.
First, consider workers whose earnings would place them in the phase-in region of the EITC
schedule if their labor supply paths were held at their non-EITC levels. Additional work increases
the current subsidy, so substitution eﬀects operate to increase hours worked. Income eﬀects
operate in the opposite direction, discouraging work. An increase in work today raises future
skill levels and labor income. So, as long as labor earnings remain less than a,a ni n c r e a s ei n
hours worked today will also increase the amount of subsidy received in the future (holding future
hours worked constant). Of course, the balance of income and substitution eﬀects on future labor
supply will also impact the future returns to current work, since hours worked in the future aﬀect
the current marginal value of additional human capital. For upward sloping labor supply curves,
the phase-in region of the EITC unambiguously increases both the current and future returns
to work. As a result, labor supply and skill acquisition increase at all ages. This prediction is
in sharp contrast to the negative eﬀects on skill formation that are expected when learning is
acquired through OJT. Increases in labor supply and skill may push incomes above a and into
the plateau region of the EITC.
The eﬀects of the EITC on individuals with earnings in the plateau region are unambiguous.
As in the OJT model, pure substitution eﬀects are absent. Only income eﬀects operate through
the marginal valuation of wealth, causing individuals to work less at all ages. As a result, skill
levels and labor incomes are reduced.
For individuals moving from the phase-in to the plateau region of EITC, all of the previously
mentioned eﬀects become relevant. Income eﬀects discourage work at all ages. Income and
substitution eﬀects are important at early ages when income is below a, but skill prices are
unchanged once incomes reach the plateau region. Assuming substitution eﬀects dominate income
eﬀects, the current returns to work are raised by the EITC in the phase-in region. However, future
20returns are largely unaﬀected by the EITC, since the subsidy is unaﬀected by increases in labor
income in the plateau region. The EITC encourages skill formation for those in the ﬁrst phase
by raising the current returns to work. When coupled with the negative wealth eﬀects over the
plateau region, we should expect smaller eﬀects of the EITC on labor supply and skill formation
for individuals moving beyond the phase-in region than we observe for those remaining in that
region.
While the phase-in region encourages work and skill formation by raising the current and
future returns to an hour of work, the phase-out region has the exact opposite eﬀect. It reduces
the net wage rate which reduces both the current and future returns to work. The lump sum
transfer of wealth also serves as a disincentive for work. As long as labor supply curves slope
upward, individuals with incomes in the phase-out stage of the EITC schedule will work less and
produce fewer skills than they would in the absence of the EITC.
The same is true for individuals moving from the plateau region to the phase-out region.
Income eﬀects operate to discourage work. While the current returns to work at early ages are
largely unaﬀected by income and substitution eﬀects, the future returns to current work are
diminished by the EITC. This is because increases in work today raise future wage rates. The
resulting increases in future earnings are partially oﬀset by a reduction in the income subsidy
when labor income exceeds b. As a result, labor supply declines and less skill is acquired.
Finally, work and skills are discouraged for individuals moving oﬀ the EITC schedule from the
phase-out region (again, assuming upward sloping labor supply curves). Wealth eﬀects discourage
work. While in the phase-out region, current returns from work are reduced by the EITC, since
for each additional dollar earned, a fraction of the tax credit is lost. Future returns are largely
unaﬀected, since no subsidy is received in periods when labor income is above c.S o ,w h i l et h o s e
moving from the plateau to the phase-out region work less because the future returns to work
were diminished, workers beginning in the phase-out region work fewer hours because the current
returns are lower.
As long as labor supply curves are upward sloping, the EITC tends to encourage work and
skill formation for the lowest income workers — those who spend some of their lives in the phase-in
region of the schedule. For all other workers with incomes always above a, the EITC discourages
work and reduces the accumulation of skills. Individuals in the phase-out region of the EITC are
most discouraged from work, since it reduces both the current and future returns to skills.
4.3 Comparing OJT and LBD
T h et w op u r em o d e l so fs k i l lf o r m a t ion sometimes predict quite diﬀerent responses of investment
t ot h eE I T C .I nt h eO J Tm o d e l ,t h eE I T Ch a sl i t t l ee ﬀect on skill formation for workers in the
phase-in region (though, if substitution eﬀects dominate for labor supply the EITC will raise
investment and work for aﬀected persons), while the LBD technology produces positive eﬀects on
21skill formation. For individuals moving oﬀ the EITC schedule from the phase-out region, the OJT
model predicts an increase in skill accumulation, while the LBD model predicts a decline. The
eﬀects on learning are reversed in both models for individuals moving from the phase-in region
to the plateau region. Workers with earnings in other regions of the EITC schedule respond with
r e d u c t i o n si ns k i l la c q u i s i t i o ni nb o t hm o d e l s ,though the magnitudes of those responses likely
diﬀer.
As was true for the two period models, few sharp analytical predictions about the magnitudes
of these eﬀects can be made without some knowledge of parameter values for preferences and
the skill production technology. We turn next to an initial empirical exploration using speciﬁc
versions of both human capital models, exploring the eﬀects of the EITC on skill formation and
labor supply.
5 Grounding The Model in Data
The appropriate way to estimate the impact of the EITC program on earnings and labor supply
is to estimate the model imposing the full constraints from the EITC schedule and from economic
theory. We do not undertake the formidable task of full structural estimation in the presence of
the EITC in this paper, leaving that for another occasion. Instead, in this paper we estimate
parameters for individual preferences and skill functions using data from a time period when
the EITC was a small-scale program for low skilled workers. The empirical results we oﬀer are
necessarily more illustrative than deﬁnitive, but provide some guidance on the likely magnitudes
of the eﬀects of the EITC on skill formation.
Responses to the EITC depend critically on where individuals lie on the EITC schedule. We,
therefore, consider a number of diﬀerent types of workers. In particular, we use data on wages and
hours worked from the 1980 March CPS to estimate preference and human capital production
parameters for women classiﬁed by race (black and white) and education (less than 10 years,
10-11 years, and 12 years of schooling). The EITC provided only modest assistance in the early
80’s and was primarily designed as an oﬀset for the social security payroll tax for low income
workers.
Because the EITC schedule is not everywhere diﬀerentiable and does not yield a convex budget
set, simple methods for solving the individual’s problem cannot be used for our simulations. To
simplify the problem, we break the life cycle into 10 periods. Beginning at age 18, individuals
are grouped by 5 year periods through age 67. See Appendix C for an explicit discussion of the
algorithm used to solve the optimization problem, and to guard against local optima.
We now present the empirical speciﬁcation for individual preferences and human capital pro-








where γ and σ are both strictly negative and ψ is positive. We choose the conventional Ben
Porath (1967) human capital production function for our OJT model:
H0 = H + B(IH)α,
where B>0 and 0 < α < 1. Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) present some evidence in
support of this form of the OJT model for men and women. There is less discussion in the
empirical literature about the speciﬁcation of learning-by-doing function. One interpretation of a
“Mincer” earnings function writes current earnings as a quadratic in cumulative work experience:




h(τ) represents total work experience accumulated to date t. We expect β0 > 0
and β1 < 0, which would yield increasing and concave wage proﬁles.19
The quadratic in experience earnings function is familiar from the Mincer (1974) model; al-
though his justiﬁcation for the speciﬁcation is as an approximation to the Ben Porath (1967)
model. In a single cross section of wages, it is impossible to distinguish between the two models,
and in practice, labor economists treat these models interchangeably despite their often contra-
dictory implications about the eﬀects of wage subsidies on skill formation.
Unfortunately, the available data do not allow us to identify all of the parameters of the
model since we lack information on consumption and wealth holdings. Since the EITC targets
low income workers, initial assets, A0, are assumed to be zero for all individuals. We assume
γ = −0.9, yielding an intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption of 1.11. We take
perfect credit markets as our base case environment, and assume an interest rate of r =0 .6105,
which corresponds to an annual interest rate of 10% (each period represents ﬁve years). We
assume a rate of time preference, δ = .6219, which yields slightly rising consumption proﬁles.
These values are consistent with the parameters reported by Browning, Hansen, and Heckman
(1999).
We use weighted non-linear least squares to estimate the remaining parameters of both human







t (wi,t − wt(Θ))2 + Qh
t (hi,t − ht(Θ))2
i
,
where wi,t and hi,t are wage rates and hours worked20 for individual i of age t from the CPS, and
wt(Θ) and ht(Θ) are wage rates and share of time worked (which includes time spent working
19Shaw (1989) ﬁts such a model. Altug and Miller (1998) estimate a more general model in which both employ-
ment and work hours produce skill. Our speciﬁcation diﬀe r sf r o mM i n c e r ’ sb e c a u s ew eu s el e v e l so fw a g e sw h i l eh e
uses logs.
20We use total hours worked divided by 5,840 (corresponding to 16 hours a day) to express hours in an amount
corresponding to a share of available time.
23and investing in skills in the OJT model) predicted by the model for a person age t,w i t ht h e
parameter vector Θ deﬁning preferences and the human capital production function. In our OJT
model, Θ includes ψ, σ, B, α,a n dH0;i no u rL B Dm o d e l ,Θ includes ψ, σ, β0, β1,a n dH0.
The weights Qw
t and Qh
t are equal to the inverse of the variance of wages and hours worked
(respectively) for that demographic group.21
Tables D-1 and D-2 in the appendix present the estimated parameter values for both models.
The ψ parameter determines how much an individual values leisure relative to consumption, and
σ determines the intertemporal elasticity for labor supply. The estimates from the OJT model
suggest that labor supply is quite inelastic for all types as seen by the large negative values for σ.
Estimates of σ from the LBD model also show inelastic labor supply, although they are generally
smaller than the OJT estimates. These estimates are within the range of estimates found in other
studies of intertemporal labor supply elasticities. (See Browning, Hansen, and Heckman, 1999,
for a recent summary of estimated labor supply elasticities in the literature.) Tables D-3 and
D-4 reveal that our LBD speciﬁcation tends to ﬁt the data better (in terms of the weighted sum
of square errors criterion) for more educated women, while the OJT speciﬁcation ﬁts the data
better for less educated women.
There is considerable heterogeneity in estimates of the human capital production parameters
across groups, reﬂecting diﬀerences in life cycle earnings proﬁles. Initial stocks of human capital
are greatest for high school graduates. Patterns for other parameters are not so easily detected.
In the LBD model, initial skill levels are more homogeneous across all groups (ranging from 2.9
to 3.8 as compared to 3.0 to 4.2 in the OJT model). Estimates of β0 tend to be greater for the
more educated workers, reﬂecting greater returns to experience. The diﬀerence between the two
sets of H0 estimates is due to on-the-job investment in the OJT model. While initial earnings are
quite similar across all groups — note the similarity in H0 estimates in the LBD speciﬁcation — the
steeper wage proﬁles among more educated workers implies that investment levels are greater for
them in the OJT speciﬁcation. Greater investment among more educated women suggests that
their initial human capital levels are larger than their initial wage levels. So, even though initial
wages are similar across education groups, initial skill levels vary more in the OJT speciﬁcation
due to diﬀerences in early on-the-job investments. A major diﬀerence between the two models
lies in the estimated elasticity of intertemporal substitution in leisure demand with respect to the
wage, which is the same as the Frisch elasticity in the separable preference speciﬁcation we use.
21If hours worked and wages in each period are measured with independent and normally distributed errors with
zero mean, this is equivalent to maximum likelihood. The parameter estimates are similar when diﬀerent weights
are used. We do not claim optimality for the estimator.
246 Simulating the Eﬀects of the EITC
In this section, we use the estimated models to simulate the eﬀects of the 1994 EITC schedule (for
families with two children) on individual decisions over the life cycle using the parameter values
described in the previous section. Since we only examine the eﬀects of the program on a single
worker, we implicitly assume that there is no other source of labor income (i.e. from a spouse).
We begin by analyzing the eﬀects of the EITC on skill formation from the OJT model. We then
simulate the eﬀects from the LBD model.
6.1 On-the-Job Training
The eﬀects of the EITC depend on an individual’s earnings proﬁle. Table 5 reports the EITC
region for the initial and ﬁnal earnings levels for less educated women,22 who tend to begin their
careers in the phase-in or plateau region and ﬁnish in the plateau or phase-out region.
To show the heterogeneity in impacts of the EITC, we focus on two classes of women with low
levels of education. In particular, we study the eﬀects of the EITC on human capital investment,
leisure, skill levels, wage rates, and wage income for white females with 12 years of education
and non-white females with less than 10 years of schooling. As shown in Table 5, they represent
workers who move from the plateau region to the phase-out region (or kink between the plateau
and phase-out region) and workers who spend their entire careers in the phase-in region. The
previous section suggests that the EITC will have diﬀerential impacts on investment and labor
supply among these subgroups of women.
We ﬁrst consider the eﬀects of the EITC on the investment (I) o fw o m e nw h ow o u l dw o r ke v e n
in the absence of the EITC, considering entry eﬀects later. As predicted, Figure 2 reveals that
investment is reduced by introduction of the EITC for both types of female workers. The solid
lines represent investment paths in the absence of the EITC; the dotted lines report investment
paths after introducing the EITC.
Hours worked for these workers are presented in Figure 3. Without the EITC, hours worked
would generally rise with age. However, with the EITC in place, life cycle proﬁles for work hours
are substantially ﬂatter, even falling over later years. Hours worked increase for the less educated
non-white females while their earnings remain in the phase-in section; however, as earnings reach
or move into the plateau region, hours worked decline due to the wealth eﬀects induced by the
lump sum subsidy. The discontinuity occurs as they reach a kink between diﬀerent regions of the
schedule. For white high school graduates, hours worked initially rise until earnings reach the
kink between the plateau and phase-out regions. At that point, hours worked decline due to the
high marginal subsidy rate, keeping earnings right at the kink.
22The earnings levels are computed for our OJT simulations when individuals face the EITC schedule. The
regions diﬀer only slightly if we considered earnings in the absence of the EITC.
25Figure 4 shows the cumulative eﬀects of on-the-job investments on human capital levels. As
could be predicted from Figure 2, white female high school graduates experience the largest
impact of the EITC on skills. Human capital levels are reduced by more than 10% at the end of
their careers. Reductions are smaller, but noticeable, for the less educated non-white women.
The resulting eﬀects of the EITC on life cycle wages can be seen in Figure 5. Wage proﬁles
ﬂatten as investment declines. Notice that the initial eﬀects on wages, which rise initially as
investment rates decline, do not reﬂect the long-term eﬀects. This suggests the importance of a
dynamic analysis. Finally, the combined eﬀects of the EITC on investment, hours worked, and
skill levels are translated into impacts on wage income, as seen in Figure 6. The impacts on wage
income are generally exaggerated versions of the impacts on wage rates. Both ﬁgures show how
workers maintain earnings at a kink in the EITC by adjusting hours of work and investment in
skills.
The impacts on lifetime earnings can be seen in Table 6. The EITC reduces labor market
earnings for all workers, with the largest eﬀects observed for the more educated women, who
begin their careers in the plateau region. The total lifetime amount of subsidy uneducated
women receive is large, reaching $20,000 in present value. For high school graduates, nearly 1/2
of the subsidy is oﬀset by a decline in labor earnings. Thus, the program reduces hours of work
among workers and also reduces their skill levels. For the majority (the number of qualifying
high school graduates far exceeds the number of dropouts), it replaces earnings with income from
“welfare”. Most of these earnings declines reﬂect increases in leisure, as decreases in skills are
generally oﬀset by reductions in investment costs.
In most cases, the short-term eﬀects of the EITC are very diﬀerent from the long-term impacts.
For the ﬁrst few periods, the least educated women increase their hours worked and only slightly
reduce investment in response to the EITC. Wages increase initially. The long-term impacts are
far diﬀerent. Investment declines still further and hours worked fall precipitously. Skill levels
and wage rates also decline substantially. This reveals the dangers of using short-term responses
to predict the long-term consequences of the EITC on individual well-being. Only a dynamic
analysis like the one we adopt can shed light on the long-term outcomes we might expect.
Thus far, we have only examined the eﬀects of the EITC on those who would have worked
in the absence of the program. As suggested by the analysis of Eissa and Liebman (1996), the
EITC may also encourage individuals to work who otherwise would not. Table 7 reports the
annual compensation required to make each of the demographic groups we analyze indiﬀerent
between working and not working. These calculations compare the utility of full-time leisure and
a constant annual income with the income and leisure associated with working for each group.
The table reveals that uneducated women can be easily induced to stay out of the labor market
for small sums of ‘welfare’ payments. The EITC only marginally reduces those sums, suggesting
small entry eﬀects should be expected.
26To estimate the total eﬀect of the EITC program on skills, it is necessary to consider potential
entry eﬀects. Eissa and Liebman (1996) estimate that the 1986 expansion of the EITC increased
employment of single women with children by about three percentage points. We explore the
consequences for skill investment of a range of potential employment eﬀects (1-7%) to determine
the total impact of the EITC on average skill levels.23
Table 8 reports employment rates based on the 1994 March CPS and average human capital
(both potential, H, and utilized, H(1−I−L)) as estimated above, assuming an equal distribution
of workers across all age groups. Utilized human capital reﬂects earnings. The reported average
human capital levels are inclusive of non-workers who are assumed to have potential skill levels
equal to H0 and to supply zero skills to the market. Skill and skill supplied to the market increase
with education levels.
In Table 9, we use our estimated preference and human capital parameters to examine the
eﬀects of increasing employment on skill formation, using a range of values for the estimated entry
eﬀect. Column 1 reports the raw diﬀerence in average lifetime skill levels for workers and non-
workers. We assume that those who do not work remain at their initial skill levels throughout their
lives, while those induced to work by the EITC accumulate skills using the technology estimated
in this paper following the human capital accumulation paths depicted in Figure 4. Columns 2-5
report the estimated impact on human capital of increasing employment by diﬀerent percentage
points. These entry eﬀects increase the average skill level in the economy by anywhere from .003
to .07 for diﬀerent women. (Note that these are diﬀerences in potential wage rates.) These must
be balanced against the disincentive eﬀects on those who are already working, as reported in
columns 6 and 7. Column 6 reports the change in skills for workers attributable to the EITC,
while column 7 weights that amount by the employment rate for the particular group. When
determining the total eﬀect on average skill levels for any demographic group, simply add the
eﬀect on skill from increased employment (from one of columns 2-5) to the eﬀect on current
workers (column 7).
Based on the evidence in the literature, a plausible upper bound entry eﬀect is a 3-5 percentage
point increase. For dropouts, the skill accumulation eﬀects at the intensive and extensive margins
are of similar magnitudes. For all but white women with 10-11 years of schooling, the negative
eﬀects at the intensive margin outweigh the positive entry eﬀects for entry eﬀects as large as
7%. Clearly, estimating the impact of the EITC on average skill levels requires knowledge of
both employment eﬀects and the eﬀects on current workers. Both eﬀects are important and they
operate in diﬀerent directions.
The bottom panel predicts how a universal EITC program (regardless of spousal earnings
23In principle, one could estimate the employment eﬀects using Table 7 and a distribution of potential welfare
(or other income) payments to workers. The entry eﬀect will depend on (1) how much the EITC raises the annual
compensation necessary to make individuals indiﬀerent between working and not working; and (2) how many
individuals are currently at the margin.
27and child status) would impact the skill levels of women with 12 years of schooling or less using
various assumptions about the program’s impact on labor force entry. In this panel, we weight
the eﬀects of the EITC for each group including employment eﬀects and those for current workers
by the proportion of the population in that group (as reported in Table 8). Overall, the EITC
reduces potential skill levels by about -0.2 (7%) among low educated women, even if entry eﬀects
are extremely large.
Table 10 repeats these calculations for skills supplied to the market (earnings = H(1−I−L) for
workers and zero for non-workers) rather than total skills, H. The positive impacts of the EITC
due to entry are generally greater when compared with the average levels of utilized skill (reported
in Table 8). The eﬀects at the intensive margin for workers are more similar in the two tables.
The net impact of the EITC on aggregate utilized human capital is negative (about −10%), even
when employment eﬀects are large, since the eﬀects on high school graduates dominate those for
lesser educated female workers. So, plausible estimates of the impact of the EITC on employment
suggest that the EITC would decrease both potential and utilized skill levels among women with
no college experience.
6.2 Learning-by-Doing
The eﬀects of the EITC on skill formation among those who would work in the presence or absence
of the program are much smaller in our estimated LBD speciﬁcation. Even though hours worked
are substantially reduced for white female high school graduates, as seen in Figure 7, human
capital accumulation is not. See Figure 8. The least educated non-white females are encouraged
to work by the EITC, since they spend their careers in the phase-in region where both future
and current returns to work are rewarded by the credit. Table 11 shows where along the EITC
schedule individuals begin and end their working careers. Most of the entries are similar to those
discussed for the OJT model (Table 5).
The small eﬀects of the program on skill formation are largely due to the speciﬁcation of the
skill acquisition function. In our speciﬁcation, human capital is a function of cumulative hours
worked. If human capital peaks at some level of total hours worked within the span of possible
values, then fewer hours worked each year mean that the critical level is reached later in life.
Therefore, wages and skills peak later, but the height of the peak is the same. Since we specify
earnings (and skills) as a quadratic function of total experience, and earnings peak at around age
45-50 for most workers, reductions in hours worked caused by the EITC (or its expansion) simply
cause a worker’s earnings to peak at a later age. The EITC does not reduce hours enough so that
earnings never reach their peak. If the inﬂuence of past hours worked on current skill production
depreciated quickly, we would ﬁnd larger eﬀects of the EITC on skill formation, since earnings
need not peak or may peak at a diﬀerent level. In any case, impacts on skills should be negative
for all workers who do not spend part of their careers in the phase-in region. That is a universal
28feature of a learning-by-doing model.
Wages are the same as skill levels in the LBD model. Figure 9 illustrates the weak estimated
eﬀect of marginal hours of work on hourly wages. Huge changes in hours of work are required
to change hourly wages by more than a few cents for most workers. Also, notice that beyond
a certain threshold, additional work reduces skills due to the quadratic speciﬁcation in total
accumulated experience. Because human capital levels are largely unaﬀected by the program, the
eﬀect of the EITC on wage earnings, as shown in Figure 10, are essentially due to adjustments
in current hours of work. Only non-white females with less than 10 years of education earn more
as a result of the EITC program.
Table 12 translates these earnings eﬀects into the lifetime present value of earnings. Earnings
reductions are typically much larger than those predicted from the OJT model, and for high school
graduates, reductions in earnings are more than one-half the supplement to earnings oﬀered by the
EITC. For the least educated women, however, the EITC substantially augments earnings with
little oﬀset from changes in behavior. The least educated non-white women actually experience
increases in labor earnings.
Table 13 shows the welfare compensation necessary to make workers indiﬀerent between work-
ing and not working in our LBD speciﬁcation. As in the OJT model, the required sums are small,
and the EITC only marginally changes those reservation values. Table 14 is the LBD analog
of Table 8, reporting employment rates and average skill levels for the diﬀerent women. Tables
14 and 15 examine the impacts of the EITC on average skills in the economy at the extensive
margin (entry eﬀects) and at the intensive margin (for workers). The entry eﬀects are similar to
those produced by the OJT model. Impacts on the potential skills of workers (at the intensive
margin) are generally small and positive, while eﬀects on skills actually supplied to the market are
large and negative as observed with the OJT model. Average potential human capital levels are
predicted to increase with the introduction of the EITC, since entry eﬀects dominate. However,
utilized skills are predicted to decline for all but the least educated, as the negative eﬀects of the
EITC on workers dominate positive entry eﬀects. While the entry eﬀects on skill formation are
quite similar to those found for the OJT model, changes in potential skill among workers caused
by the EITC are typically much smaller than in the OJT model. This could have been anticipated
from a comparison of the strong eﬀect of the EITC on human capital in the OJT model (Figure
4) and the weak eﬀect in the LBD model (Figure 8). The EITC, therefore, is predicted to have
slightly larger impacts on average potential skill levels when the LBD model is used. In contrast,
the LBD model often produces more negative impacts on the utilized skills of workers than the
OJT model (compare the ﬁnal columns of Tables 10 and 16). This is largely due to the substantial
eﬀects of the EITC on hours worked in the LBD model. In both models, however, the eﬀects
of the EITC on the total utilized skills of women with low levels of education are dominated by
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀects on workers even when employment eﬀects are quite large. For small entry
29eﬀects (of 1 percentage point), impacts on skills supplied to the market (i.e. earnings) are as large
as 18% of average levels for the LBD model, whereas the OJT model predicts slightly smaller
responses.
6.3 Accounting for Life Cycle Eligibility Due To Children
Thus far, we have focused on the impacts of the EITC ignoring other family income or the number
of qualifying children. The simulation results presented in the previous sections compare the case
of extending the EITC to all workers vs. removing the EITC for all workers.
The EITC has diﬀerent schedules based on the number of children living in the household.
This seemingly harmless qualiﬁcation can drastically aﬀect estimated behavioral responses to the
EITC, since families cannot expect to receive the credit (or at least the larger credit for parents)
for their entire working careers unless they continue to have qualifying children. In general,
families can only expect to receive the credit for 20-30 years, depending on how many children
they have and how they space them. Additional sources of family income alter the analysis
in a predictable way to reduce eligibility. We focus on the less obvious eﬀects of current child
requirements.
Modifying the analysis to account for limited time periods of EITC qualiﬁcation substantially
changes the implications for workers ending their careers in the phase-in or phase-out regions of
the EITC. If termination of EITC eligibility due to failure to meet the child requirement occurs
in the phase-in region, future returns to investment in skills are no longer subsidized. Only costs
of investment are increased, so the disincentive eﬀects reduce skills. In our simulations, the EITC
only has moderate negative impacts on investment for the least educated women due to income
eﬀects on labor supply. It will have substantially larger negative impacts on their skill formation
if they cannot receive the beneﬁts from increased subsidy levels later in their careers, as would
be the case if their children grow too old for them to qualify for the credit. On the other hand,
for workers ending their careers in the phase-out region, termination of the credit due to aging
children removes the tax on returns to investment that causes more educated female workers to
scale back their investments. For workers who end their careers with earnings too high to qualify
for the credit, the child restriction is of little consequence.
7 Evidence on OJT vs. LBD
We have, thus far, discussed the varied impacts of the EITC on skill formation and wage growth
using two standard human capital models. The OJT and LBD models predict opposite eﬀects
on investment and wage growth. While changes in the EITC over time could potentially be used
to test which model better represents the skill formation process, the complexity of the program
m a k e st h i se x t r e m e l yd i ﬃcult to do in practice.
30In Heckman and Lochner (2002), we use data from the Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance
Experiments to estimate the eﬀects of a short-term (3 years) increase in marginal income tax rates
on wage growth. These experiments, conducted in the 1970s, randomly assigned low income
families to diﬀerent negative income tax schedules (for 3-5 years) that included marginal tax
rates ranging from 50% to 80%. While both models of human capital formation predict that the
short-term income transfers and high marginal tax rates associated with the experiment should,
at least temporarily, reduce labor supply, the OJT and LBD models predict opposite eﬀects on
skill formation and wage growth.24 As discussed in Section 2.1, the OJT model predicts that
a short-term increase in income tax rates will encourage human capital investment and increase
wage growth while the LBD model predicts the opposite. The estimates by Heckman and Lochner
(2002) suggest that wage growth rates were about 10% lower among male treatments facing the
negative income tax schedules than among male controls facing the standard U.S. federal tax
schedule. This ﬁnding suggests that wage growth decreases with increases in short-term tax
rates, consistent with the theory of learning-by-doing and not on-the-job training.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
The EITC has been justiﬁed on the grounds that it transfers income to the working poor, par-
ticularly struggling mothers, without substantially reducing their incentives to work. It also
stimulates non-workers to work. This paper explores the impact of the EITC on incentives to
work and accumulate skills in two diﬀerent models of human capital formation. Correct speciﬁ-
cation of the skill formation process is critical to understanding the eﬀects of the EITC on skills,
since diﬀerent models produce very diﬀerent predictions of its eﬀects on skill formation. Theory
is ambiguous about the eﬀects of the EITC on skill formation, so it is necessary to undertake an
empirical analysis of the question.
In order to measure the empirical eﬀects of the EITC, preference and human capital production
parameters for two canonical models of skill formation are estimated from the wage and hours
worked proﬁles of less educated working women using the 1980 CPS. Those parameters are then
used to predict individual responses in labor supply and investment caused by introduction of the
EITC.
We ﬁnd that in a training model in which skills are produced by costly time investments (OJT),
the EITC encourages skill investment for workers who begin their careers in the phase-out region
and end their careers above the EITC income cut-oﬀ. Time spent working is much lower during
the phase-out region and slightly higher beyond that region. None of the less educated women
we study earn this much. Among female high school dropouts and graduates, who spend their
careers within the income limits of the EITC schedule, the EITC substantially reduces investment
24Results in Robins and West (1980a,b) empirically support the prediction for labor supply.
31and skill formation. Labor supply is initially higher for workers facing the EITC schedule, but
t h el i f ec y c l ep r o ﬁle is ﬂatter and hours worked are lower later in the life cycle.
Using our estimated experience-based learning-by-doing model of skill formation, we ﬁnd very
diﬀerent impacts from the EITC. While labor supply is generally reduced by the EITC (by as
much as 20% in some periods for working women in the phase-out and plateau regions), the
eﬀects of the EITC on skill formation are quite small. Skills marginally increase among the least
educated dropouts, whose earnings remain within the phase-in region of the schedule.
Impacts of the EITC on skill formation at the extensive (or entry) margin are essentially the
same for both skill models. To the extent that the EITC raises employment rates by making
work more attractive, it also raises skill levels. For any given increase in work rates, the increase
in human capital supplied to the market from increased employment does not depend much on
how those skills are formed. In the OJT model, the impacts on skill formation of the EITC for
entrants and for those who would work under any event, are of the same order of magnitude, but
of the opposite sign. Marginal changes among workers tend to dominate, causing the EITC to
decrease potential and utilized skills among less educated women. For the LBD model, the entry
eﬀects on the formation of potential market skills are much stronger than the eﬀects on those who
would work in the presence or absence of the program, whose human capital is only marginally
aﬀected. The greatest diﬀerences between models of skill formation are found for workers at the
intensive margin deciding how much to work and invest in additional skills. When considering
utilized skills, the two models are largely in agreement, predicting negative impacts of the EITC
on average earnings levels. We estimate declines as large as 18% of current average utilized skill
levels if entry eﬀects are small.
The empirical evidence presented in this paper can only be regarded as suggestive rather than
deﬁnitive. Like the rest of the literature, we have not yet produced a reliable estimate of the
eﬀect of the EITC program on employment among those who would not work in its absence. Our
estimated entry eﬀects are simply educated guesses about plausible magnitudes of the response.
However, unless the true entry eﬀects are extremely large, negative eﬀects of the EITC on current
workers are likely to dominate the positive eﬀects through induced entry.
Much more empirical work is required to determine the exact mechanism of skill formation and
how learning opportunities are priced in the market. We have compared two simple speciﬁcations.
T h eE I T Ch a sl a r g ee ﬀects on training in an OJT model but weak eﬀects on labor supply. It
has little eﬀect on skills and larger labor supply impacts when studied within the LBD model we
employ.
A more general model of skill formation that recognizes the existence of markets for jobs and
that derives explicit solutions for the prices of jobs with diﬀerent learning opportunities would be
desirable. We have demonstrated the importance of knowing the exact mechanism by which skills
are produced and how jobs with diﬀerent learning content are priced. The exact speciﬁcation of
32preferences and skill formation requires much further study before we can be sure which model
is more appropriate.
At our current level of understanding, the evidence shows that the EITC has a negative impact
on the average skill levels of less educated women. (However, it may have large eﬀects on other
groups of workers as shown in Heckman, Lochner and Cossa, 1999.) This is because the positive
impacts due to entry are typically dominated by the negative eﬀects on those who would work
in the presence or absence of the EITC program. Furthermore, some workers respond to the
EITC by increasing their skill levels, while others reduce their skills. In the empirically plausible
range, the program reduces earnings among less educated women. This eﬀect operates primarily
through (long-term) labor supply disincentives. The EITC may have substantial eﬀects on most
workers, while only having a minor eﬀect on average skill and wage levels. Econometric methods
that only identify mean eﬀects of programs like the EITC miss the larger picture.
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35Appendix A
Table A-1: Deﬁnition of EITC Regions for CPS Calculations
Region Income Range
I (phase-in) W<0.95 a
II (ﬁrst kink) 0.95 a ≤ W<1.05 a
III (plateau) 1.05 a ≤ W<0.95 b
IV (second kink) 0.95 b ≤ W<1.05 b
V (phase-out) 1.05 b ≤ W<0.95 c
VI (third kink) 0.95 c ≤ W<1.05 c
VII (no credit) 1.05 c ≤ W
The values of a,b,c are obtained from Table 1
36Appendix B
N o n c o n c a v i t yo ft h eR e w a r dF u n c t i o ni nt h eB e nP o r a t hm o d e l
i nt h eP r e s e n c eo fa nE I T CP r o g r a m
For simplicity, set R =1 , r =0 , H0 =1 . Then consider V (I) for a program where there is
either a phase-out range or a no program range. For I>k , we assume that a person is in the
phase-out range (branch 3). For I ≤ k, we assume that a person is in the no program range (no
tax or subsidy). Using τ as the phase-out tax rate, we may write V (I) for two values of I1 and
I2, which in the second period place the individual in the no-EITC zone.
V (I1)=( 1+τ)(1 − I1)1(I1 >k )+( 1− I1)1(I1 ≤ k)+F(I1)
V (I2)=( 1+τ)(1 − I2)1(I2 >k )+( 1− I2)1(I2 ≤ k)+F(I2)
We can always ﬁnd such values of I1 and I2. (This is trivial if the agent starts in the no program
range.) Provided investment is suﬃciently productive, we can move the agent from the phase-out
range to the no program range. This requires that we ﬁnd values of I1 such that (1 − I1) <
c, F(I1)+1 >cso 1 − c<I 1,F(I1) >c − 1.A s s u m i n g F is monotonically increasing
Max{1 − c,F−1(c − 1)} <I 1. Then letting I = λI1 +( 1− λ)I2,0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
V (I)= ( 1 + τ)(1 − I)1(I>k )+( 1− I)1(I ≤ k)+F(I)
= τ(1 − I)1(I>k )+( 1− ¯ I)+F(I).
Next, we obtain
λV (I1)+( 1− λ)V (I2)
= λτ(1 − I1)1(I1 >k )+λ(1 − I1)+λF(I1)
+(1 − λ)τ(1 − I2)1(I2 >k )+( 1− λ)(1 − I2)+( 1− λ)F(I2)
=( 1− ¯ I)+τ(λ(1 − I1)1(I1 >k )) + τ((1 − λ)(1 − I2)1(I2 >k ))
+λF(I1)+( 1− λ)F(I2).
V (I) is concave if
V (I) ≥ λV (I1)+( 1− λ)V (I2),
or
τ(1 − I)1(I>k )+F(I) ≥
τ[λ(1 − I1)1(I1 >k )) + ((1 − λ)(1 − I2)1(I2 >k )] + λF(I1)+( 1− λ)F(I2).
Clearly, F(I) − λF(I1) − (1 − λ)F(I2) ≥ 0 by concavity in F(I). However, it is not necessarily
true that for τ > 0
(1 − I)1(I>k ) ≥ [λ(1 − I1)1(I1 >k )+( 1− λ)(1 − I2)1(I2 >k )].
Provided I>0, it is possible that I<k , but either I1 or I2 >k . Then the concavity condition
may or may not hold. Thus for certain ranges of values of investment we may obtain concavity
of the reward function while for others we do not. If investment is suﬃciently productive, the
37contribution of F(I)−(λ)F(I1)−(1−λ)F(I2) may oﬀset the non-concavity arising from the jump
in the indicator functions.
38Appendix C
Solution Algorithm for Individual Optimization Problem
Problems with discontinuities and a non-convex budget set require that non-standard solution
methods be employed in solving the individual’s optimization problem. This is why we reduce
the life cycle problem to ten periods. Because gradient methods cannot be used, we use the direct
search complex algorithm DBCPOL in Fortran 77 to simultaneously solve for all consumption,
leisure, and investment (for the OJT model) values when maximizing lifetime utility subject to
the appropriate human and physical capital accumulation constraints. In the OJT model, this
amounts to trying a path for investment and leisure. Calculating the optimal consumption path
given this investment and leisure path is trivial. Then, total lifetime utility is found. These steps
are iterated using the DBCPOL algorithm until the maximizing consumption, leisure, and invest-
ment proﬁles are found. We use multiple starting values for each proﬁle to determine whether the
optimization procedure produces global optima. Reasonable starting values for investment and
leisure generally produce a global optimum. In particular, we use the optimal paths for leisure
and investment when the EITC is not imposed as initial guesses, and we always ﬁnd that this




This appendix reports the parameter estimates and goodness of ﬁtf o rt h em o d e l su s e di n
the paper. Tables D-1 and D-2 report the parameter estimates for the OJT and LBD models,
respectively. The weighted sum of squared errors are reported in Tables D-3 and D-4, along with
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